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Abstract
JavaScript is the most widely used web language for client-side ap-
plications. Whilst the development of JavaScript was initially just
led by implementation, there is now increasing momentum behind
the ECMA standardisation process. The time is ripe for a formal,
mechanised specification of JavaScript, to clarify ambiguities in the
ECMA standards, to serve as a trusted reference for high-level lan-
guage compilation and JavaScript implementations, and to provide
a platform for high-assurance proofs of language properties.
We present JSCert, a formalisation of the current ECMA stan-
dard in the Coq proof assistant, and JSRef, a reference interpreter
for JavaScript extracted from Coq to OCaml. We give a Coq proof
that JSRef is correct with respect to JSCert and assess JSRef using
test262, the ECMA conformance test suite. Our methodology en-
sures that JSCert is a comparatively accurate formulation of the En-
glish standard, which will only improve as time goes on. We have
demonstrated that modern techniques of mechanised specification
can handle the complexity of JavaScript.
Categories and Subject Descriptors D.3.1 [Programming Lan-
guages]: Formal Definitions and Theory
Keywords JavaScript, mechanised semantics, Coq
1. Introduction
JavaScript is by far the most widely used web language for client-
side applications. Initially, JavaScript development was entirely led
by implementation, with Netscape releasing the first JavaScript im-
plementation in 1996 and Microsoft responding with their own ver-
sion in the same year. Netscape quickly realised that standardi-
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sation was crucial. Client code that works on some of the main
browsers, and not others, is not useful. The first official standard
appeared in 1997. Now we have ECMAScript 3 (ES3, 1999) and
ECMAScript 5 (ES5, 2009), supported by all browsers. There is
increasing momentum behind the ECMA standardisation process,
with plans for ES6 and 7 well under way.
JavaScript is the only language supported natively by all major
web browsers. Programs written for the browser are either writ-
ten directly in JavaScript, or in other languages which compile to
JavaScript. This fundamental role seems unlikely to change. How-
ever, JavaScript is very complex. The ECMAScript standards, by
necessity, are large and full of corner cases. Despite the best ef-
forts of their editors, these documents are sometimes unclear and,
in some isolated cases, even inconsistent. We believe the time is
ripe for a formal, mechanised specification of JavaScript, to clar-
ify ambiguities in the ECMA standards, to serve as a trusted ref-
erence for high-level language compilation and JavaScript imple-
mentations, and to provide a platform for high-assurance proofs of
language properties.
We introduce JSCert, a mechanised specification of ES5 written
in the interactive proof assistant Coq. We also introduce JSRef,
an executable reference interpreter extracted from Coq to OCaml.
We give a Coq proof that JSRef is correct with respect to JSCert.
The correctness proof ensures that we can have full confidence that
a JSRef program has the behaviour specified by JSCert. All our
Coq code is available at http://www.jscert.org. We believe
that both JSCert and JSRef are necessary: JSCert, unlike JSRef,
is well-suited for developing inductive proofs about the semantics
of JavaScript; JSRef, unlike JSCert, can be used to run JavaScript
programs.
Our challenge is to convince ourselves and others that JSCert
is indeed an accurate formulation of the ES5 English specification.
We designed JSCert to follow the structure of the ES5 English stan-
dard as much as possible. Whenever we found parts of ES5 En-
glish prose to be ambiguous, we checked the browser implementa-
tions and were active on discussion groups such as es-discuss.
We also ran JSRef on the official ECMA test suite, test262. Since
JSRef is correct with respect to JSCert, failed tests meant discrep-
ancies between ES5, JSCert, and the tests. Using this methodol-
ogy, we were able to correct several bugs in JSCert and JSRef. We
also discovered, and reported [58, 60], a number of bugs in all the
browser implementations, the ECMA standards, and test262. We
have demonstrated that modern techniques of mechanised specifi-
cation can handle the complexity of JavaScript.
JSCert. We introduce JSCert, a mechanised Coq specification of
ES5. In 2008, Maffeis, with Mitchell and Taly from Stanford, de-
veloped a hand-written, small-step operational semantics for for-
mally describing the full behaviour of JavaScript [36, 37], faithfully
following ES3 except when the English standard was incorrect or
ambiguous. Apart from moving to ES5, we also differ from [36]
in that we use a big-step semantics to be closer to the style of the
English prose. However, the traditional big-step approach would
lead to many duplicated rules, since the JavaScript control flow is
quite complex. We use a pretty-big-step semantics, an approach re-
cently developed by Charguéraudfor a simple ML dialect [11]. Our
work here demonstrates that the technique scales to a real-world
standard, and yields a close connection between ES5 and JSCert.
Note that we are not trying to usurp ES5, which has an ease
of readability that would be difficult to match with a mechanised
specification. We are aiming for an accurate, mechanised specifi-
cation of ES5 which can be used for clarification when the ES5
prose is unclear. By gathering a team of Coq and JavaScript ex-
perts, we have been able to handle the size and the complexity of
the JavaScript semantics.
As with most large specification projects, a significant ques-
tion is when to stop. We have formally specified the core language,
where we believe most of the interest for our project lies. We have
not specified the for-in command, because in trying to do so we
discovered that ES5 and ES6 are broken in this respect.1 We
have not specified the parsing of JavaScript source code, which
would be a challenging, orthogonal task. Also, our formalisation
of native libraries is partial. We have formalised nearly all of the
library functions that expose internal features of JavaScript, with
the exception of functions involving arrays which is future work.
In particular, we have formalised most of the functions from li-
braries Object, Function, Boolean, Number, and Errors. We
are not planning to formalise the other native libraries. They con-
tain hundreds of library functions that do not interact with internal
JavaScript features, in the sense that they could be implemented as
plain JavaScript code.
JSRef. We introduce JSRef, an executable reference interpreter,
which we have proved correct with respect to JSCert and tested
using the ECMAScript conformance test suite, test262. By design,
JSCert is not directly executable. It is presented as an inductive
definition, essential for developing safety proofs, and it matches
the looseness of ES5’s “implementation-dependent” features. We
therefore developed a computable Coq specification and, from this,
automatically extracted the corresponding OCaml code, obtaining
the executable reference interpreter JSRef. Our computable Coq
specification follows the ES5 pseudo-code as much as possible.
Where the implementation details were left unspecified, we made
arbitrary but natural choices.
In fact, we developed JSCert and JSRef in parallel. This ap-
proach was invaluable when understanding an unclear part of ES5:
we sometimes needed the specifier’s broad intuition; sometimes the
implementer’s pragmatic intuition about what was really meant.
Recall that JSCert specifies the core language of ES5, but does not
specify the parser nor many of the native libraries. The same re-
strictions apply for JSRef. In particular, we rely on an off-the-shelf
JavaScript parser, taken from the Google Closure Compiler [25],
for parsing the initial source code and for implementing eval.
1We have filed a bug report (n. 1444 of [58]) for ES6.
Trust. Our methodology for obtaining trust in our mechanised
semantics can be summarised as follows:
ES5 JSCert JSRef Tests
eyeball correctness running tests
For JSCert, trust arises from the ‘eyeball closeness’ of JSCert
to ES5. We can place the English prose and the formal rules side-
by-side, and compare the two: one line of ES5 pseudo-code corre-
sponds to one or two rules in JSCert. If commands need changing,
as inevitably they will for future standards, it is relatively straight-
forward to see which part of JSCert needs changing.
For JSRef, we have a machine-checked correctness proof that
it satisfies JSCert. More precisely, we prove in Coq that, if the
execution of a JavaScript program in JSRef returns a result, then
there exists a reduction derivation in JSCert relating this program
to this result. Because of the looseness of ES5, our interpreter
cannot be proved complete. Nevertheless, we believe that, on the
deterministic subset of ES5, our interpreter is complete. We trust
the extraction mechanism of Coq, used to obtain the OCaml code
of JSRef, since it is standard and widely-used (e.g., in [8]).
We also test JSRef using test262 [18]. JSRef successfully exe-
cutes all the tests that we expect to pass given our coverage of JS-
Ref. There are 2782 tests associated with the core language (chap-
ters 8–14): we pass 1796 tests; the others fail due to for-in, calls
to libraries we have not specified, or the parser. We also use the
OCaml bisect tool [14] to investigate the coverage of these tests.
Our emphasis on testing provides a different level of trust from that
usually found in Coq development (see related work), which is per-
haps more accessible to JavaScript implementers and programmers.
It also provides a first step in the analysis of what it means to trust
test262.
As we were developing the proof of correctness and running
the tests, we inevitably found bugs in JSCert and JSRef. It was
necessary to go around the loop many times, fixing inaccuracies,
continuing with the correctness proof and testing, and so on. Our
correctness proof guarantees that JSRef is an accurate reference
interpreter for JSCert (up to our trust of the Coq extraction process).
However, despite our principled development of JSCert and JSRef,
we cannot yet guarantee that JSCert is bug free in the sense that
there may well be mismatches with ES5. A few mismatches will
be due to the ambiguity of ES5. The ECMA authors have been
very responsive to our queries on es-discuss and it has always been
possible to reach consensus. Other mismatches, however, will be
due to inaccuracies in JSCert. We do believe that, over time, with
more proof reading and testing by ourselves, and with help from
others, we will be able to eliminate all the bugs.
Applications. There are many potential applications of JSCert
and JSRef. For example, we can investigate properties of fragments
of JavaScript used for secure sandboxing by companies such as
Yahoo!, Google, and Facebook. Several high-level languages are
compiled to JavaScript. JSCert provides a formal target to verify the
correctness of the compilation. A natural first language to explore
in this respect is Microsoft’s F∗ compilation to JavaScript (and back
for full abstraction, see related work). JavaScript implementers can
compare their implementation with JSRef. For example, a direct
extension of our work would be to characterise the differences
between Firefox and JSRef by running the Firefox test suite on
JSRef. A dream is that our mechanised specification might even
be used as part of the creation of future ECMA standards: ES6
is already taking shape, but ES7 is only just being planned. This
paper demonstrates that it is feasible to provide a Coq specification
of ES5 together with a reference interpreter passing the ES5 tests.
We are impacting on ES6 with bug reports. It may not be beyond
reach to provide a mechanised specification for ES7 as part of the
official standard.
2. Related work
A real-world language specification can come in many forms: an
implementation of the compiler/VM as specification (e.g., PHP);
an English definition with varying degrees of rigour (e.g., the C
standard [10] and ES5 are fairly precise and complete); a formal
mathematical specification (e.g., Standard ML [41]); and mecha-
nised specification. Our work on JavaScript is part of the estab-
lished tradition to mechanise existing, real-world programming lan-
guage specifications. In this section, we survey related work on the
large-scale mechanisations of programming languages in general,
and on various formalisations of JavaScript in particular.
2.1 Large-scale mechanised specifications
One of the most prominent, fully formalised presentations of a
programming language is Standard ML by Milner, Tofte, Harper,
and Macqueen [41]. A mechanised specification was given by Lee,
Crary, and Harper [34] in the Twelf theorem prover [48]. Unlike
ML, many real-world languages are designed without formalism in
mind. Such languages provide a considerable challenge to mecha-
nisation.
There has been a wide body of work on mechanised language
specifications in HOL. For example, Norrish [44] specifies a small-
step operational semantics of C in HOL [43], and proves substantial
meta-properties of the semantics. Norrish’s formalism has not been
tested for conformance with implementations. Another example
is Sewell et al.’s work [7] on formalising transmission control
protocols (TCP) in Isabelle/HOL [43]. They created a post-hoc
specification of TCP from several prominent implementations, an
enterprise not so far off the creation of the original ECMA standard
for JavaScript. Although not focusing on language specification,
their work is notable in the context of our work as it validates
the specification against several thousand test traces captured from
implementations, using a special-purpose symbolic model checker
programmed above HOL.
In the CompCert project [15], Blazy and Leroy [8] built a ver-
ified optimising compiler for CLight, a significant fragment of C,
with a Coq proof that the generated compiled code behaves exactly
as prescribed by the semantics of the source program. The Comp-
Cert project initiated major technological breakthroughs in Coq
mechanisation, some of which we substantially use in this project.
The aims of the projects are different. CLight was not intended to
capture precisely the C specification. Also, CLight is not directly
executable, although it would be possible to obtain an interpreter
without too much additional effort, by leveraging the Coq code ex-
traction mechanism. Several substantial projects build on Comp-
Cert: Appel’s verified software tool chain [3] combining program
verification with verified compilation; Shao’s project to certify an
OS kernel; Zhao et al.’s verified LLVM which extracts an inter-
preter from Coq code that is tested using the LLVM regression suite
(134 out of 145 runnable tests); and Sewell’s CompCertTSO [61],
verifying compilation the x86 weak memory model [1].
The use of proof assistants such as HOL and Coq requires quite
a substantial learning curve. Researchers are beginning to explore
how to make mechanised specification easier. The K framework
is designed specifically for writing and analysing language defini-
tions using a rewrite logic [19]. In particular, Ellison and Rosu [19]
have defined an executable formal semantics of C in K [53]. Their
formalisation has been extensively tested against the GCC torture
suite [22]. Besides being executable, their semantics also comes
with an explicit-state model checker. Their aim is to define an accu-
rate reference interpreter, justified by testing, rather than provide a
full semantics of the C standard. Their work is analogous to JSRef.
In addition, the Ott tool [55] provides a lightweight environment
using ASCII notation for writing definitions of programming lan-
guages and calculi, which automatically translate to HOL, Isabelle,
and Coq. Owens et al. have developed a mechanised semantics of
OCaml Light using Ott.
For space reasons, we cannot detail all the interesting exam-
ples of mechanised specifications of programming languages. In-
evitably, there is a wide body of work on mechanised specifications
of Java and C#: e.g., Syme’s HOL semantics [56] of Drossopoulou
and Eisenbach’s formal Java semantics [17]; the executable formal-
isation of the C# standard by Börger et al. [9] using Abstract State
Machines [29]; and the executable formal semantics of Java 1.4 in
rewrite logic by Farzan et al. [20]. We should also mention the for-
mal semantics of Batty et al. on C++ concurrency [4, 5], which is
currently having real impact on the C11 standard [10]. The work
is currently not mechanised but, considering the research group, it
will surely happen soon.
Our mechanised specification of ES5 shares many of the dif-
ficult challenges faced by the work described above, and involves
many new ones due to the complex dynamic nature of JavaScript.
They are detailed in § 4. We now provide a more detailed survey
on formalising and mechanising the JavaScript semantics.
2.2 Formal JavaScript specifications
In 2005, Anderson et al. [2] and Thiemann [59] were the first to
propose formal type systems for subsets of JavaScript. To prove
type-soundness, they formalised idealised cores of the language
that abstracted away features not crucial for the type analysis at
hand, focusing instead on the challenges addressed by their analy-
ses. Since then, researchers have studied various typed JavaScript
subsets and static analyses, including [12, 13, 26, 27, 30, 32, 33,
45–47]. For example, Jensen et al. [33] used abstract interpretation
to develop a tool to infer abstract types for the full language, al-
though the formal theory only works for subsets. Others have stud-
ied information flow [13], with [30] proving their results in Coq.
All these techniques have been helpful for addressing specific
safety problems. None provide general-purpose analyses, most do
not work with the full language and, of those that prove soundness,
all do so with respect to their abstract models rather than the ECMA
semantics or an actual concrete implementation. The security issues
identified in [35, 38, 39] demonstrate that the semantic subtleties
of corner cases of the language matter crucially. Moreover, the
empirical analysis by Richards et al. [52] confirms that some of
the language features, excluded by construction from the work
mentioned so far, are in fact important for actual web programmers.
In 2007, Herman and Flanagan [31] proposed a formalisation
of the JavaScript semantics as a definitional interpreter written in
ML. Their interpreter was the first executable formal semantics for
a non-trivial subset of JavaScript. The advantages of their approach
were the ability to test their interpreter and the familiarity of their
work to functional programmers. The drawbacks were a loose
correspondence with the specification and implementation details
that sometimes obscured the semantics of the language features.
In 2008, Maffeis, Mitchell, and Taly [37] defined the first full
operational semantics for the ES3 language. They covered the
whole language, apart from a few corner cases such as regular
expressions, dates, and machine arithmetic. The formalisation con-
sists of a large set of small-step operational semantics rules and
some theorems about the determinacy and well-definedness of
the language. This work has been useful to prove soundness of
security-related JavaScript subsets [35, 38, 39], and influenced the
definition of further JavaScript formalisations. For example, the se-
mantics of Secure ECMAScript underlying [57], and the big-step
operational semantics of core JavaScript, proposed in [24] and used
in [6], is based on this work. This formal semantics differentiates it-
self from the work described above because its goals were to cover
the entire language, without excluding “uncomfortable” features,
to serve as a basis for formal proofs of real language properties.
The main shortcomings of this work is that, since the rules are not
mechanised, the proof of language properties is labour intensive,
the maintenance and extension of the semantics is not easy, and a
comparison with implementations is impossible.
In 2010, Guha et al. [28] came up with a completely differ-
ent approach to developing language semantics. They provide a
translation from JavaScript to a Scheme-like, executable language,
called λJS, which has as its core a simple λ-calculus with refer-
ences. Their aim was to develop provably sound type systems to
reason about the safety of client-side web applications. They target
the Firefox implementation of ES3, and validate their semantics
by testing it against the test262 and Mozilla test suites [18, 42].
More recently, λJS has been extended to model the strict mode of
ES5 [50], and an unpublished, small-scale Coq formalisation of λJS
has been announced on the Brown PLT blog [51].
The work on λJS has been influential in proving properties of
well-behaved JavaScript typed subsets, where the programmer ac-
cepts restrictions on full JavaScript in exchange for safety guar-
antees. For example, Politz et al. [49] define a type system for λJS
that captures the informal restrictions enforced by Crockford’s AD-
Safe [16], a subset of JavaScript for sandboxing web advertising.
Fournet et al. [21] define a translation between F*, a subset of Mi-
crosoft F# with refinement types, and λJS. They show that their
encoding is fully abstract, hence the safety properties enjoyed by a
source F* program are preserved when it is translated to JavaScript
and run on a trusted web page. The λJSwork has also been a signif-
icant source of inspiration for our development of our executable
semantics, JSRef, and our focus on testing. We have tested JSRef
using the test262 conformance tests, and in future will use the Fire-
fox test suite to compare JSRef with the Firefox implementation.
Our work is not the first to give a formal and/or executable se-
mantics to JavaScript. However, JSCert is the first semantics for
the entire language, closely reflecting the official standard, which
is both executable and formalised in a proof assistant. Working with
the source language itself, and reflecting the structure of the spec-
ification has several advantages over a translational approach: the
JavaScript programmer intuition is better reflected; the semantics
is robust to local changes of the standard, such as those anticipated
for ECMAScript 6 and 7; and the correctness of the semantics does
not rely on possibly unknown assumptions associated with transla-
tion.2
Throughout this project, it has been important for us to estab-
lish trust in our mechanised semantics. As JSCert and JSRef are
explored by ourselves and other formalists, by people compiling to
JavaScript, by JavaScript implementers, and maybe even by ECMA
authors, so our trust will increase. If someone questions our inter-
pretation of ES5 or if a test fails, we know which part of JSCert to
check and alter. Building on much of the work detailed above, we
believe we have developed a methodology for providing a trusted
mechanised specification of an English language standard. We do
just wonder if this methodology has been fully demonstrated be-
fore.
3. The JavaScript standard
We give an overview of the semantics of JavaScript, as described in
the ECMAScript 5 standard and implemented in current browsers
2 In order to prove the correctness of such a translation, one needs a formal
semantics for the source language in the first place. In this sense, our work
will make it possible to prove the correctness of the encoding of JavaScript
in λJS, increasing confidence in the validity of λJS or F* safety properties
on actual JavaScript programs.
(§ 3.1). We introduce our running example (§ 3.2), and identify the
parts of the standard that have not been included in our mechanised
specification (§ 3.3).
3.1 ECMAScript 5
ECMAScript 5 (ES5) is the current standard for JavaScript. Ex-
isting browsers largely implement ES5, but sometimes introduce
custom extensions or make different choices in how to implement
certain cases that the specification defines as “implementation de-
pendent”. In addition to the language, ES5 also describes a col-
lection of native libraries, which provide convenient functionality
(e.g., handling of regular expressions, date formats) as well as a
few extra language features (useful for reflection). In this paper,
we focus on the language itself, only specifying the native libraries
necessary for the extra language features.
The grammar of JavaScript is divided into three main cate-
gories: expressions, statements, and programs. A JavaScript pro-
gram consists of a list of statements. The body of a function defi-
nition is a JavaScript program. Similarly, the argument of the no-
torious eval statement, once parsed, is a JavaScript program. The
result of the evaluation of an expression, statement, or program is
a completion triple. A completion triple is composed of a type, a
value, and a label. The type is one of Normal, Return, Break,
Continue, or Throw, corresponding to the termination mode of the
evaluation. The value, which can be empty, describes the result of
an expression or statement (if the type is Normal), the value carried
by a return statement (if the type is Return), or the object describ-
ing the exception being thrown (if the type is Throw). The label,
which can also be empty, is only used for Break and Continue
types, in order to divert the execution flow to the instruction anno-
tated with the target label.
One of the reasons we were attracted to study ES5 is that it
has not been defined with mechanised specification in mind. The
standard is not optimised for conciseness and reuse. It has a lot of
copy/paste which increases the workload of our formalisation. The
standard uses representations that are practical for e.g., VM imple-
menters, but less helpful for reasoning. For example, completion
triples have implicit invariants that for our purposes would be better
captured with an inductive definitions. Also, the standard becomes
very particular when describing browser-specific extensions, and is
not explicit about whether under-specified functions should have
deterministic behaviours.
Apart from this determinism issue, we have found ES5 to be
precise and non-ambiguous, with two exceptions. First, the speci-
fication of data attributes, used to represent parameters of proper-
ties (object fields) such as writable and enumerable flags, has two
different representations in different parts of the specification. We
give both representations in our specification and prove that they
are equivalent, so that we can follow ES5 as closely as possible.
Second, the specification of for-in suffers from major issues re-
lated to the loose specification of the order of enumeration of the
property names [58].
3.2 Running example: the while statement
There are many interesting features in the semantics of JavaScript.
These include prototype-based inheritance, return value propaga-
tion through “empty” statements, implicit type conversion (which
may result in arbitrary side effects), the unique JavaScript approach
to variable resolution, and the notorious with and eval statements.
All of these features are properly described by our JSCert seman-
tics. Since space is limited, we chose just one language feature
to demonstrate our approach, and at least some of the subtleties of
the JavaScript language. Our running example will be the while
statement.
“while ( Expression ) Statement” is evaluated as follows:
1. Let V = empty.
2. Repeat
a. Let exprRef be the result of evaluating Expression.
b. If ToBoolean(GetValue(exprRef)) is false, return
(normal, V, empty).
c. Let stmt be the result of evaluating Statement.
d. If stmt.value is not empty, let V = stmt.value.
e. If stmt.type is not continue || stmt.target is not in the
current label set, then
i. If stmt.type is break and stmt.target is in the current
label set, then return (normal, V, empty).
ii. If stmt is an abrupt completion, return stmt.
Figure 1. ECMAScript 5 semantics of while loops
Fig. 1 shows the English specification of while exactly as it ap-
pears in the ES5 standard. The text should be interpreted as pseudo-
code, executing each statement in order. The ES5 specification of
while is relatively short in comparison with other constructs, such
as switch, whose specification spans more than one full page. This
ES5 pseudo-code, like a traditional imperative programming lan-
guage, leaves completely implicit three major aspects of the se-
mantics. The first aspect is divergence; ES5 never talks explicitly
about diverging programs, but it should be understood that if the
evaluation of a sub-expression diverges, then the parent expression
will also diverge. The second aspect is the threading of the mu-
table state; ES5 assumes that there is one global heap storing ob-
jects, and that the instructions in the pseudo-code can modify such
heap. The third is the propagation of exceptions through expres-
sions; ES5 describes the semantics of expressions in terms of the
result of the sub-expressions, but does not recall every time that
exceptions propagate outwards from expressions.3 Unlike ES5, our
JSCert specification is fully explicit about divergence, mutation,
and exceptions.
We describe the pseudo-code from Fig. 1 in more detail. The
basic skeleton is standard: repeat the loop body until the loop con-
dition becomes false, or until the body of the loop produces a break,
a return, or an exception. Step 2b is non-standard, illustrating one
of the mechanisms necessary to interact with JavaScript’s variable
store. The result of an expression is not necessarily ready to be
used, but may be a reference to a variable stored as a field of an
object. The internal GetValue function is used to de-reference it.
In addition, JavaScript uses the internal function ToBoolean to im-
plicitly coerce the loop guard to a boolean before attempting to test
it. A further complication comes from the fact that JavaScript al-
lows labelled break and continue statements that may refer to an
outer loop. A current loop may be interrupted by such labelled
break and continue operations, just like it would be interrupted if
an exception was thrown. In Fig. 1, the “current label set” refers to
the set of labels that are associated with the current loop (since a
loop might have several labels as in e.g., a:b:c:while(1){break b;}).
Finally, notice that while loops have a return value in JavaScript.
The definition of the JavaScript syntax forbids us from writing
statements like 1+while(x>3){x−−}, however it does allow 1+eval
("while(x>3){x−−}"). The assignments to the internal pseudo-
code variable V in Fig. 1 are aimed at maintaining the value that
will serve as the “result” of the current while loop. The value V is
3 In ES5, the propagation of exceptions out of expressions is implicit,
whereas the propagation of exceptions out of statements is explicit. This
asymmetry is not only awkward, it is also a potential source of ambiguities.
This issue has been resolved in ES6, where, like in our formalisation, the
propagation of exceptions is always explicitly specified.
used in one of two cases: a break or a continue has been issued for
this loop, or a break or a continue has been issued for an outer loop
and does not yet carry a non-empty value.
Without further details, the reader may appreciate the complex-
ity of JavaScript semantics with respect to output values of state-
ments by looking at the following while loop examples, which re-
turn the last value that was produced by a statement in their body
(if any):
eval("a: while(1){ while(1){ break a; }}")
==> undefined
eval("a: while(1){ while(1){ y=2; break a; }}")
==> 2
eval("a: while(1){ x=3; while(1){ y=2; break a; }}")
==> 2
eval("a: while(1){ x=3; while(1){ break a; }}")
==> 3
The most surprising example is the fourth one: 3 is returned be-
cause the statement x=3 has completion value 3 and the statement
while(1){ break a; } has an empty completion value.
3.3 What we do not specify
The ES5 standard is a document of 16 chapters, ranging over 209
pages, plus some additional annexes. It consists largely of pseudo-
code in the style of Fig. 1, with clarifications in English. The docu-
ment includes: the specification of parsing; the specification of the
syntax (e.g., objects, heaps, environment records); the pseudo-code
describing the semantics of expressions, statements, programs, and
internal properties; and the pseudo-code describing the semantics
of native library functions.
We have given a mechanised Coq specification for the impor-
tant part of the language: the syntax (as an abstract syntax tree); the
semantics of expressions, statements and programs; and most na-
tive library functions that expose internal features of JavaScript. In
particular, we have specified the Object, Function and Errors
libraries, with the only exception being functions involving the ma-
nipulation of arrays. We also have specifications for the construc-
tors and most functions from the libraries Boolean and Number.
For floating-point numbers, we rely on the Coq formalisation of
IEEE 754 standard provided by the Flocq library [40].
We have not formalised other standard libraries, such as Array,
String and Date. These libraries involve hundreds of functions.
The vast majority of them do not interact with any internal fea-
ture of JavaScript, and could be implemented as plain JavaScript
code [54]. The specification of these JavaScript standard library
functions is orthogonal to the formalisation of the JavaScript pro-
gramming language per se.
We also have not specified the parsing of JavaScript programs.
Parsing is important because of JavaScript’s eval statement, which
requires parsing source code at runtime. The normalisation of the
formal grammar of a programming language is more complicated
than one might expect. The parsing of JavaScript programs is made
particularly tricky by the treatment of implicit semi-colons, as it in-
volves a one token look-ahead. We therefore leave the specification
of parsing to future work, and use the parser of the Google Closure
Compiler [25] in our reference interpreter JSRef.
4. JSCert: JavaScript specification in Coq
Our formal development in Coq, available from our project’s web-
page http://www.jscert.org, consists of five main parts:
Syntax of
the language
Auxiliary
Definitions
JsCert
(pretty-big-step semantics)
JsRef
(purely-functionnal interpreter)
Proof of
correctness
Inductive restype := (* result type *)
| restype_normal
| restype_break
| restype_continue
| restype_return
| restype_throw.
Inductive resvalue := (* result value *)
| resvalue_empty : resvalue
| resvalue_value : value→ resvalue
| resvalue_ref : ref→ resvalue.
Inductive reslabel := (* result label *)
| reslabel_empty : reslabel
| reslabel_string : string→ reslabel.
Record res := { (* completion triple *)
res_type : restype;
res_value : resvalue;
res_label : reslabel }.
Figure 2. JSCert completion triples
The first part describes the syntax and data structures, such as
heaps and scopes, that are used to describe the formal semantics.
The second part contains a collection of auxiliary definitions, such
as functions used to convert a primitive value (a value that is not
object) into a boolean, a number, or a string. These first two parts
are described in § 4.1. The next two parts correspond to JSCert
(§ 4.2) and JSRef (§ 5). The last part contains the correctness proof,
that any result computed by JSRef is correct with respect to the
semantics from JSCert (§ 6).
4.1 Syntax and auxiliary definitions
We give a simple summary of the syntax and auxiliary definitions
shared by JSCert and JSRef. The full Coq specifications are given
in the file JsPreliminary.v.
Abstract syntax tree. Following common practice, we do not
model the parsing of language source code. Instead we work di-
rectly on the AST (abstract syntax tree). We obtain the AST by
running the parser of the Google Closure Compiler [25], extended
with some additional interface code defined by us.
The grammar of JavaScript expressions and statements is de-
fined, in file JsSyntax.v, through a conventional inductive def-
inition that represents the abstract syntax tree. This definition is
relatively short, since there are only 13 kinds of expressions and 17
kinds of statements. We should note that we have factorised sim-
ilar forms of if-statements and try-statements using option types,
and that the definition of expressions depends on the grammar of
literals (null, bool, number, string), the grammar of the 11 unary op-
erators, and the grammar of the 24 binary operators. A JavaScript
program consists of a list of statements, plus a strictness flag which
stipulates the evaluation order of the list of statements. The body of
a function definition is itself a JavaScript program. The argument
of a call to eval, once parsed, is also a JavaScript program.
Completions. As we noted in § 3, the result of the evaluation of
an expression, a statement or a program produces a completion
triple, as given in Fig. 2. A completion triple (type res) is made
of a type, an optional value (or reference, if the expression is a
variable name), and an optional label. The type is one of Normal,
Return, Break, Continue, or Throw, corresponding to the control
flow directive obtained from an evaluation. The value, if any, is
either a primitive value (a literal or undefined) or the location
of an allocated object. This value describes the result of a Normal
expression or statement, the value carried by a Return statement,
or the exception being thrown in a Throw result. The optional
label of a completion triple is only used for Break and Continue
types, in order to implement the break label and continue label
instructions.
A number of invariants apply to completion triples. For exam-
ple, if a completion triple carries a non-empty label, then it must
be of type Break or Continue. In order to better capture all the
invariants on completion triples, we were tempted to use a clean
inductive definition with one constructor per type, and different ar-
guments for each type. However, recall that one of our goals is
a direct correspondence between our JSCert specification and the
ES5 standard. A change in the representation of something as fun-
damental as completion triples would put considerable distance be-
tween the English prose of the ES5 and our formalisation of it.
Forced to choose between a more elegant Coq representation and
a more direct correspondence with the ECMA standard, we chose
the latter.
Program execution. A JavaScript program is always executed in
a given state and in a given execution context. The state consists
of the set of allocated objects (the heap), plus the set of allocated
environment records.
The heap. The JavaScript object heap is represented as a finite
map from locations to objects. An object is represented as a record
with 25 fields, including the prototype object, the class name,
a boolean extensible property, an optional primitive value
(for objects of class Boolean, Number or String), the property map,
as well as internal methods such as get or put, optional fields such
as body and scope for functions, and optional internal methods
such as call or construct. Each internal method may have a
small number of different behaviours depending on the object on
which it is called (Arguments objects, for instance, have a differ-
ent implementation of [[Get]]). We distinguish these different be-
haviours using a tag that describes how the internal method should
be processed.
Object properties. The property map binds field names to prop-
erty attributes, rather than directly to values. A property at-
tribute is a record that contains a number of fields. There are
two kinds of property attributes: data property attributes which
have a value field, a writable field, an enumerable field, and
a configurable field; and data accessor attributes which have a
get field, a set field, an enumerable field, and a configurable
field.
The ES5 standard suggests that property attributes should be
represented as a record with 6 optional fields. In particular, the
specification of the function DefineOwnProperty involves the
construction of a property attribute, which explicitly manipulates
records using arbitrary subsets of the 6 optional fields. At the
same time, in many other places, the standard uses exactly 4
fields, (loosely) making the assumption that particular fields are
present and implicitly exploiting the fact that the property attribute
is known to be either a data property or a data accessor attribute
from the context and implicit invariants.
Since we wanted to be faithful to the standard everywhere, we
chose to provide two distinct representations of data properties: the
first consists of a record with 6 optional fields; and the second con-
sists of an inductive type with two cases, one for data property at-
tributes and one for data accessor attributes, both represented as
records with exactly 4 mandatory fields. The overhead of defining
conversion functions between the two forms was negligible com-
pared to the benefits of avoiding the pollution of many rules with
accesses to optional fields.
Environment records. Recall that the JavaScript state consists of
the heap and the set of allocated environment records. We store
environment records in a similar data structure to that used for the
object heap, using a pointer to refer to a given environment record.
An environment record can take one of two forms: a declarative
environment record, which maps variable names to values (and to
mutability flags); or an object environment record, which consists
of the location of a JavaScript object (and some “provide-this”
flags). Declarative environment records provide the local scoping
associated with function calls, while object environment records
provide the dynamic scoping associated with the with construct.
In addition, there is always at least one object environment record
which points to the global object. To properly model function
closures, a given function object represents the environment it
closes over as a lexical environment stored in one of its internal
fields.
Execution context. The execution context is represented as a
triple that consists of the scope (both the lexical environment and
the variable environment, as specified by ES5), the current “this”
object, and the current strictness flag. We represent both lexical en-
vironments and variable environments as a stack (a list) of pointers
to environment records.
4.2 JSCert
Based on the syntax and auxiliary definitions described above, the
main JSCert rules are defined in the file JsPrettyRules.v. We
formalise the semantics of JavaScript statements using a judgement
of the form t/S/C ⇓s o, where: t denotes a statement; S denotes
the state comprising the object heap and the environment record
heap; C denotes the context comprising the lexical and variable
environment, the ES5 “this” object, and the strictness flag; and o
denotes the output. We have similar judgements ⇓e,⇓i and ⇓p for
expressions, internal reductions, and full programs.
For terminating computations, the output is a pair made of the
final state and the completion triple produced by the evaluation.
Our JSCert semantics, expressed in pretty-big-step style [11], also
captures diverging computations, using a coinductive interpretation
of the same set of evaluation rules. We discuss this further below.
One key ingredient to the factorisation of the evaluation rules is
the definition of the output of an evaluation as a sum type, shown
below, that describes either termination in a given state with a given
result, or divergence:
Inductive out :=
| out_ter : state→ res→ out
| out_div : out.
Internal reductions, however, return results of many different
types. Some, for instance, return property descriptors. We thus use
a more general return type, specret T, that is parameterised by
the type T of what is returned. To add further complexity, internal
reductions may call arbitrary user code which may terminate with
an abrupt termination, such as throwing an exception, or which may
diverge. Their return type is, thus, not uniform: it returns a modified
state and a term of type T when the computation is successful;
it returns a term of type out when the computation diverges or
results in an abrupt termination. This behaviour is captured by the
following type:
Inductive specret T :=
| specret_val : state→ T→ specret T
| specret_out : out→ specret T.
Pretty-big-step semantics. We express the JSCert semantics us-
ing the pretty-big-step operational semantics recently developed by
Charguéraud [11]. The key difference between the traditional big-
step semantics and Charguéraud’s pretty-big-step semantics is that
we can decompose the evaluation of a single program construct
using intermediate forms (defined in JsPrettyInterm.v), which
extend the grammar of program statements and can be evaluated
just like any other program. This style of semantics allows us to
more effectively match the modularity of the ES5 standard.
The advantages of the pretty-big-step semantics have been de-
scribed in [11]. Here, we only recall the arguments applicable to
large existing language standards such as ES5. Nearly all English
standards for industrial programming languages, including ES5,
use sentences of the form “let R be the result of evaluating t”.
These sentences relate a term directly to its result, just as a big-
step judgement would do. Because we want to be close to ES5, we
cannot work with a small-step presentation, as in [37], with rules
of the form “to evaluate if e then t1 else t2, execute one step to
reduce e into e1, and then evaluate if e1 then t1 else t2.”
If we attempt to use traditional big-step semantics, we quickly
find that we have to duplicate a significant amount of material
across several rules. For example, consider the loop while(e){ t }.
In big-step, we need a rule to handle the case where e evaluates to
an exception, another rule for the case where e evaluates to a value
converted to the boolean false, yet another rule for the case where
e evaluates to a value converted to the boolean true and the body of
the loop evaluates to an exception, and so on.
The problem here is that the steps made by a big-step semantics
are “too big” to cleanly correspond to ES5. As suggested by our
example, if we attempt to shoehorn ES5 into a big-step presenta-
tion, our repetition of premises will lead to a quadratic explosion in
the size of our rule set. For an idealised research programming lan-
guage, this sort of duplication may not present much of a problem.
However, we soon realised that formalising ES5 in this way would
quickly become unmanageable. This observation motivated the de-
velopment of the pretty-big-step semantics, which has enabled us
to write rules which very closely follow the structure of ES5.
Pretty-big-step semantics for while loops. Consider the ES5 de-
scription of while loops given in Fig. 1. The corresponding JSCert
semantics is given in Fig. 3. Notice the close correspondence be-
tween the steps of the ES5 pseudo-code and the JSCert rules. Step 1
of the ES5 pseudo-code says “Let V=empty”. The corresponding
rule red_while_1 uses the notation stat_while L e1 t2 to refer to a
while construct with guard e1, body t2 and label set L (used for
managing break and continue statements). The rule says that in a
given state, the loop may evaluate to the output o if the intermediate
form
stat_while_1 L e1 t2 resvalue_empty
also evaluates to o. This intermediate form carries all the informa-
tion of the original while construct, and also carries the additional
information that the value of “V” is resvalue_empty, which is
our Coq representation of the ES5 “empty” value.
Step 2 of Fig. 1 begins the loop in the ES5 pseudo-code. In our
JSCert rules, we may loop back to this point at any time, by using
the stat_while_1 intermediate form as a premise of a rule.
Now let us consider Steps 2a and 2b. These steps represent
a pattern which is very common in ES5. First we evaluate some
sub-expression, then we perform a GetValue and a type conver-
sion on the result of that evaluation. In this case, we are convert-
ing to a boolean. Notice that a great deal is left implicit in the
ES5 pseudo-code, which we wish to make explicit in our rules:
the sub-expression or statement could diverge or throw an ex-
ception; the type conversion could diverge or throw an excep-
tion;4 and both the sub-evaluation and the type conversion could
have side effects on the program state. This pattern occurs so fre-
quently that we introduced a special intermediate form to handle
4 This is actually not the case for conversions to booleans, but it may happen
in conversions to other types, such as String or Number.
red_while_1
stat_while_1 L e1 t2 resvalue_empty/S/C ⇓s o
stat_while L e1 t2/S/C ⇓s o
red_while_2a_2b
spec_expr_get_value_conv spec_to_boolean e1/S/C ⇓i y1
stat_while_2 L e1 t2 rv y1/S/C ⇓s o
stat_while_1 L e1 t2 rv/S/C ⇓s o
red_while_2b’_false
stat_while_2 L e1 t2 rv (vret S false)/_/C
⇓s out_ter S rv
red_while_2b’_true_2c
t2/S/C ⇓s o1 stat_while_3 L e1 t2 rv o1/S/C ⇓s o
stat_while_2 L e1 t2 rv (vret S true)/_/C ⇓s o
red_while_2d
rv′ =
(
If res_value R 6= resvalue_empty
then res_value R else rv
)
stat_while_4 L e1 t2 rv’ R/S/C ⇓s o
stat_while_3 L e1 t2 rv (out_ter S R)/_/C ⇓s o
red_while_2e_false
res_type R = restype_continue ∧ res_label_in R L
stat_while_1 L e1 t2 rv/S/C ⇓s o
stat_while_4 L e1 t2 rv R/S/C ⇓s o
red_while_2e_true
¬(res_type R = restype_continue ∧ res_label_in R L)
stat_while_5 L e1 t2 rv R/S/C ⇓s o
stat_while_4 L e1 t2 rv R/S/C ⇓s o
red_stat_exception
out_of_ext_stat t = Some o abort o
¬(abort_intercepted_stat t)
t/S/C ⇓s o
red_while_2e_i_true
res_type R = restype_break ∧ res_label_in R L
stat_while_5 L e1 t2 rv R/S/C ⇓s out_ter S rv
red_while_2e_i_false
¬(res_type R = restype_break ∧ res_label_in R L)
stat_while_6 L e1 t2 rv R/S/C ⇓s o
stat_while_5 L e1 t2 rv R/S/C ⇓s o
red_while_2e_ii_true
res_type R 6= restype_normal
stat_while_6 L e1 t2 rv R/S/C ⇓s out_ter S R
red_while_2e_ii_false
res_type R = restype_normal
stat_while_1 L e1 t2 rv/S/C ⇓s o
stat_while_6 L e1 t2 rv R/S/C ⇓s o
Figure 3. JSCert semantics of while loops
it, while making these side effects, divergence, and exception prop-
agation clear. The reader may see this special intermediate form
at work in the rule red_while_2a_2b. Here, the intermediate form
spec_expr_get_value_conv takes care of the evaluation of e1,
its GetValue, and its type conversion. In this case, we specify
which type to convert to using the flag spec_to_boolean. The re-
maining work of Step 2b is performed by rule red_while_2b’_false.
Notice that since the type-conversion may have side effects, the
rule red_while_2b’_false takes its initial state S from the result
of the type conversion as given by the intermediate form. Rule
red_while_2b’_false is a terminating rule, since the corresponding
ES5 step says to “return (normal, V, empty)”. In our formalisation,
the pseudo-code variable V corresponds to the variable rv. Since
we do not mention a completion type, our formalism assumes the
completion type “normal”, and since we do not mention a label set,
our formalism assumes the label set “empty”. This is done in Coq
using a type coercion:
Coercion res_normal rv := { res_type = restype_normal;
res_value = rv; res_label = label_empty }
Step 2c (which corresponds to rule red_while_2b’_true_2c) fol-
lows the pretty-big-step pattern: evaluate some sub-expression or
statement (in this case t2), and store the result in some pseudo-
code variable. Each new pseudo-code variable becomes a param-
eter of a new intermediate form – in this case the o1 parame-
ter of stat_while_3. Notice that the rules red_while_2b’_false
and red_while_2b’_true_2c both assume that the result of the type-
conversion performed by rule red_while_2a_2b was successful. In
the event that the type conversion diverges, or throws an excep-
tion, that “aborting computation” will be propagated by the gen-
eral rule red_stat_exception5. We handle divergence and excep-
5We have similar “aborting computation” rules for expressions, internal
reductions, and full programs.
tional termination of the loop body (Statement in ES5 and t2 in our
formalism) in exactly the same way. The rule red_stat_exception
uses the out_of_ext_stat function to extract the output from
any intermediate form, checks that this output is an aborting one,
and checks that this aborting computation should not be inter-
cepted by a more specific rule. For example, in a while loop com-
putation, if an exception or divergence happens in Step 2c, in-
stead of always propagating the exception/divergence, in some
cases we want to intercept it. That is, the part of the definition of
abort_intercepted_stat t is the case where t can be pattern-
matched with stat_while_3 L e1 t2 rv (out_ter S R). In
this case the value of abort_intercepted_stat t is:
res_label_in R L ∧(
res_type R = restype_continue ∨
res_type R = restype_break
)
This condition checks for exceptional terminations caused by
continue and break statements that target the particular loop that
we are currently evaluating, and should be properly handled by
Step 2e (below).
Step 2d is another conditional assignment, which we handle
with a condition of our own in rule red_while_2d. Notice that we
insist that we will only proceed with step 2d if our previous steps
terminated. This insistence is encoded in our pattern matching for
out_ter S R—which is the result of a terminating computation.
The case in which the previous computation did not terminate is
handled also by the abort rule which propagates diverging results.
Step 2e begins a nested conditional expression. It is simplest
to describe the “false” case first, since this results in simply loop-
ing back to the beginning of Step 2. This case is handled by rule
red_while_2e_false, the first premise of which is the negation of
the guard written in Fig. 1. The second premise of this rule be-
gins the next iteration of the loop by re-using the intermediate form
stat_while_1. In the “true” case, rule red_while_2e_true contin-
ues with a new intermediate form.
Step 2e(i) is another conditional expression, which we describe
with two simple rules. The “true” case which describes the ter-
minating computation breaking out of the loop corresponds to
rule red_while_2e_i_true. The “false” case, which continues to
step 2e(ii) corresponds to rule red_while_2e_i_false.
Finally, we come to step 2e(ii): another conditional, modelled
with a pair of rules. The “abrupt completion” case, which termi-
nates the computation corresponds to rule red_while_2e_ii_true.
The “normal” case, which loops back to the beginning of Step 2
using the stat_while_1 intermediate form corresponds to rule
red_while_2e_ii_false.
It is a simple matter to express the rules given above as Coq
definitions.6 For example the rule red_while_2e_ii_false can be
written in Coq as follows.
| red_while_2e_ii_false : ∀S C labs e1 t2 rv R o,
res_type R = restype_normal→
red_stat S C (stat_while_1 labs e1 t2 rv) o→
red_stat S C (stat_while_6 labs e1 t2 rv R) o
JavaScript formalisation challenges. The first challenge with
formalising ES5 is the size of the definition. ES5 consists of 16
chapters (209 pages, plus some additional annexes) of English lan-
guage and pseudo-code description. While we do not aim to for-
malise the parsing of concrete JavaScript syntax (most of chap-
ters 1-7), JSCert and JSRef cover, and have a correctness proof for,
all of chapters 8-14 and 16, except for the for-in statement (chap-
ter 12), array initialisation (chapter 11) and some type conversions
(chapter 9). See http://www.jscert.org for the current state of
our JSCert specification, which will grow over time. We choose
not to formalise for-in at this stage because it is loosely speci-
fied and broken: based on the ES5 standard and conversations with
ES5 authors and browser implementors, we filed bugs in the current
draft of the upcoming ES6 standard (bugs 1444 and 1443 of [58]).
Still, it is an interesting challenge to give a more precise descrip-
tion of the semantics of for-in and we leave it for future work.
Chapter 15 contains the native libraries, and would be consider-
able work to specify in full. We have JSCert rules and JSRef code
(but no correctness proof) for those parts of chapter 15 where the
libraries expose important JavaScript features.
The inductive definition of JSCert is sometimes a little verbose,
as illustrated by the rules for while. This verbosity is due to the
fact that we closely follow ES5, which is itself quite verbose, and
we are being fully explicit about the evolution of the state and the
context. In contrast, we shall see that the JSRef fix-point presen-
tation is significantly more compact (§ 5). Despite its verbosity,
the inductive presentation of JSCert is ideally suited to conducting
formal proofs, because it gives a fine-grained view of the different
steps, allowing modular reasoning about the evaluation of a given
JavaScript language construct. Moreover, as we have experienced
with the verification of the code of JSRef with respect to JSCert,
the regularity of the pretty-big-step rules (which never have more
than two evaluation premises), significantly eases the development
of specialised tactics that help automate formal proofs.
The second main challenge with formalising ES5 is the high
complexity of the behaviour of a few features such as the represen-
tation of scopes and variable lookup, the non-obvious representa-
tion of data attributes, the treatment of function calls and arguments
6 In our Coq development, we use a slightly different naming convention
for the evaluation rules, which we believe will be easier to maintain when
migrating from one version of the ECMA standard to the next. That said,
for pseudo-code involving more than 5 steps, we left a comment next to
each evaluation rule indicating its corresponding ES5 step number.
object, and the aforementioned evaluation of for-in. Several fea-
tures introduced in ES5, such as execution contexts and strict mode,
are spread throughout the specification and hence are non-trivial to
capture.
Finally, JavaScript “internal methods” can return types not al-
lowed to user code, and yet may call user code. We thus had to
devise a definition that was flexible, yet allowed for proofs to be au-
tomated as much as possible. The next section on JSRef illustrates
how such an effort enabled us to factorise much of the presentation
using a monadic approach.
Semantics of diverging programs. ES5 never explicitly mentions
diverging programs— a program diverges as soon as the evaluation
of any subprogram diverges. Even though we have not conducted
so far any formal reasoning related to divergence, we could for-
mally capture the semantics of diverging JavaScript programs with-
out requiring additional work. The constant out_div, which we in-
troduced in the grammar of outputs o, materialises divergence. This
constant is propagated through the evaluation rules, just as excep-
tions are propagated. We derive the judgement capturing the se-
mantics of diverging programs by considering a coinductive inter-
pretation (greatest fixed-point) of the exact same set of evaluation
rules as we have for terminating programs. Additional details may
be found in [11].
5. JSRef: a reference interpreter for JavaScript
Our goal in defining JSRef is to obtain an executable JavaScript
interpreter, whose definition closely follows ES5 and can be proved
correct with respect to JSCert. Note that JSRef does not need to be
fast. It simply needs to be efficient enough to interpret programs
such as those found in the JavaScript test suites.
Host language for JSRef. We have chosen to write JSRef directly
in Coq: that is, in a core, purely-functional language that admits
only total functions. We could have chosen to use an imperative
language with implicit state in the hope that this would make trans-
lating ES5 pseudo-code easier. However, this would have made the
correspondence between our interpreter and our formal specifica-
tion much more difficult to establish. By using Coq as a program-
ming language, we make JavaScript’s state and exception propaga-
tion explicit (which we consider an advantage), and make the for-
mal statement and proof that our interpreter is sound comparatively
straightforward, as described in § 6.
Structure of JSRef. The interpreter consists of a record that con-
tains functions for evaluating programs, statements, expressions,
function calls, and so forth. The record type, slightly simplified for
clarity, appears below:
Record runs_type : Type := runs_type_intro {
runs_type_expr : state→ execution_ctx→ expr→ result;
runs_type_stat : state→ execution_ctx→ stat→ result;
runs_type_prog : state→ execution_ctx→ prog→ result;
runs_type_stat_while : state→ execution_ctx→ resvalue
→ label_set→ expr→ stat→ result; ...}.
Since our Coq implementation must consist only of terminating
functions, we bound the number of steps that JSRef may take in
any given run, a standard technique in ACL2 and Coq. This is
similar to decide in advance “If it hasn’t finished in 30 days, I’ll
hit Control-C”. The token result_bottom is the result of a com-
putation that was interrupted in this way. In practice, it is rare
to observe result_bottom, because we can specify a very large
bound on the number of steps. We thus define our runs function
as a fixpoint which takes an integer as an argument and returns a
record of functions with the type of the record above:
Fixpoint runs max_step : runs_type := match max_step with
| O⇒
{ runs_type_expr := fun S _ _⇒result_bottom S;
runs_type_stat := fun S _ _⇒result_bottom S;
runs_type_prog := fun S _ _⇒result_bottom S;
runs_type_stat_while := fun S _ _ _ _ _⇒result_bottom S;
...}
| S max_step’⇒(* max_step = 1 + max_step’ *)
{ runs_type_expr := fun S⇒run_expr (runs max_step’) S;
runs_type_stat := fun S⇒run_stat (runs max_step’) S;
runs_type_prog := fun S⇒run_prog (runs max_step’) S;
runs_type_stat_while := fun S⇒
run_stat_while (runs max_step’) S;
...}
end.
Each function in the record takes the record itself as its first pa-
rameter, instantiated with one fewer step, and all recursive calls are
routed through the record. For example, run_stat runs S C s eval-
uates the statement s in the state S (heap of objects and environ-
ment records) and in the evaluation context C (used for variable
lookups), so long as the record runs contains functions for running
any kind of term (programs, statements, expressions, etc.). As a
first approximation, the reader may simply think of the projections
runs.runs_type_expr as a direct recursive call to the function for
evaluating expressions.
The function run_javascript below uses a record runs built
with a sufficiently large number to serve as a bound on our recursive
calls. Since the bound is handled by this record, it does not pollute
our main development.
Definition run_javascript runs p : result :=
runs.runs_type_prog state_init execution_ctx_init p.
An evaluation using a function from JSRef returns a result,
which is either a completed computation, or a special token that
states the interpreter has reached an impossible state or that the
computation did not terminate in the allocated time. As with
JSCert, the type of the result may depend on what is being evalu-
ated (typically for internal reductions); we thus define the following
polymorphic resultof type:
Inductive resultof T :=
| result_some : T→ resultof T
| result_impossible
| result_bottom : state→ resultof T.
The token result_impossible is returned by the interpreter if
an invariant of the JavaScript language is violated: e.g., if the ES5
internal GetOwnProperty method is somehow called on a primi-
tive value. We claim that starting from a well-formed initial state,
the interpreter will never return result_impossible because we
conjecture than all invariants are preserved by execution.
As first approximation, terminating programs have a result of
type resultof out (as defined in § 4.2, except that out_div is never
used), whereas internal reduction have a result of type resultof (
specret T) for some T. In fact, for purpose of better code factorisa-
tion, terminating programs have the following result type, which
is isomorphic to resultof out:
Inductive nothing : Type :=. (* uninhabited *)
Definition result := resultof (specret nothing).
Since there is no inhabitant of the nothing type, the only way to
obtain a result_some of the result type is through specret_out,
which carries a value of type out. This approach guarantees that
every result type is an instance of specres T = resultof (specret
T), greatly simplifying the definition of monadic operators.
Monadic-style programming in JSRef. In order to avoid clut-
ter, JSRef is programmed in a monadic style. For example, say
Definition if_result_some (A B : Type)
(W : resultof A) (K : A→ resultof B) : resultof B :=
match W with
| result_some a⇒K a
| result_impossible S⇒result_impossible S
| result_bottom S⇒result_bottom S end.
Definition if_spec (A B : Type)
(W : specres A) (K : state→ A→ specres B) : specres B :=
if_result_some W (fun sp⇒
match sp with
| specret_val S0 a⇒K S0 a
| specret_out o⇒
if_abort o (fun _⇒result_some (specret_out o))
end).
Figure 4. Two JSRef monadic operators
1 Definition run_stat_while runs S C rv labs e1 t2 : result :=
2 if_spec (run_expr_get_value runs S C e1) (fun S1 v1⇒
3 Let b := convert_value_to_boolean v1 in
4 if b then
5 if_ter (runs.runs_type_stat S1 C t2) (fun S2 R⇒
6 Let rv’ := ifb res_value R 6=resvalue_empty
7 then res_value R else rv in
8 Let loop := fun _⇒runs.runs_type_stat_while S2 C rv’
labs e1 t2 in
9 ifb res_type R 6=restype_continue
10 ∨ res_label_in R labs
11 then (ifb res_type R = restype_break
12 ∧ res_label_in R labs
13 then res_ter S2 rv’
14 else (ifb res_type R 6=restype_normal
15 then res_ter S2 R else loop tt))
16 else loop tt)
17 else res_ter S1 rv).
18
19 Definition run_stat runs S C t : result :=
20 match t with
21 | stat_while ls e1 t2⇒
22 runs.runs_type_stat_while S C ls e1 t2 resvalue_empty ...
Figure 5. JSRef semantics of while loops
we want to evaluate a composite expression e which contains sub-
expression e1. First we evaluate e1. If this evaluation terminates
with a completion triple of type normal, then we want to use the
value produced by e1. However, if the evaluation of e1 produces
either result_bottom or result_impossible, we want to prop-
agate this result immediately, without executing the rest of the code
for processing e. In JSRef, this pattern requires a simple use of the
if_spec monadic operator: if_spec (runs.run_expr_get_value S
C e1)(fun S’ v1→ ...), where the “...” contains the code for process-
ing the result value v1 of e1 in the updated state S1. Fig. 4 shows the
definition of if_spec. It depends on if_result_somewhich first fil-
ters out the cases where the computation failed. Otherwise, the con-
tinuation K is called on the result. The if_spec function constructs
such a continuation (fun sp⇒...), which ensures that the result of
the computation is not an abrupt termination (a result of the form
specret_out o where o satisfies the predicate abort).
JSRef function for while loops. Fig. 5 shows the function
run_stat_while used to interpret while statements. The three first
arguments have been described before. Arguments e1 and t2 are
respectively the condition and body of the while loop. Argument
labs is a set of labels annotating the loop (to deal with break and
continue statements). Finally, rv is the current value to return in
the completion triple. It corresponds to the V of Fig. 1. Intuitively,
calling this function amounts to executing the JavaScript statement
labs:while(e1){t2} starting from heap S and execution context C.
As we reuse this function for the next step of the loop, we also need
to carry around the last computed value rv. As shown in the extract
from run_stat, rv is initially set to the empty value.
We now detail the code of the loop. We first evaluate the condi-
tion e1 and capture its result using the continuation (fun S1 v1⇒...).
Remember that this continuation runs only if the result of the com-
putation is successful and if it is not an abrupt termination. The
value v1 is then converted to a boolean to choose which branch of
the if to execute. If it is false, the else branch is taken (Line 17),
and the current state is returned alongside with the last computed
value rv (coerced to the triple (normal,rv’,empty)). Otherwise, the
statement t2 is evaluated using the monadic operator if_ter. This
operator is very similar to if_spec, except that it applies the con-
tinuation even if the result is an abrupt termination. This allows us
to check for a break or continue result from running the statement.
Lines 6 and 7 update rv if the result value of the statement was not
empty.We then inspect the termination type of the result to proceed.
Line 16 is taken if it is a continuewith its label in labs. Otherwise,
if the result is a break with its label in labs, then the computation
terminates as a normal result (Line 13). If the result is not normal
(e.g., a return or a break with a different label), then it is returned
as such (Line 15, then branch). Finally, if the result is normal, then
the next iteration of the while loop is run (else branch).
Note how the while loop code in JSRef is more concise than
that in JSCert. This observation applies in general to most parts of
the definitions. Overall, the full definition of JSCert is∼3,000 lines
of Coq, whereas the corresponding definition of JSRef is ∼2,000
lines.
Running the interpreter. The Coq system provides a way to au-
tomatically extract OCaml code from the definition of computable
functions. This is crucial to our ability to run our interpreter and
test it against existing test suites. There are experimental tools that
allow the extraction of OCaml code directly from an inductive def-
inition, such as the one of JSCert. We did not pursue this approach
for the following reasons: these tools are not yet mature; the de-
velopment of JSRef is independently interesting; and, this way, we
could make natural choices when ES5 was underspecified.
At the expense of some trust, Coq provides the ability to lo-
cally override the default mapping from Coq values and types to
OCaml values and types. Of course, this feature should be used
sparingly. We use it in two ways. First, as previously explained, we
rely on an untrusted parser. More precisely, our development as-
sumes the existence of a parser returning either some AST or none
in case of a parse error: Axiom run_parse : string→ option prog
In order to run tests and execute the eval operator, we provide an
OCaml function that implements run_parse by calling an existing
JavaScript parser [25] and then translating the output to the OCaml
representation of our AST for JavaScript code. The second cus-
tomisation regards numbers. In JavaScript, all numbers are IEEE
754 double precision floating-point numbers. In our formalisation,
we use the Flocq library [40] to precisely model IEEE 754 floating-
point numbers and their operations. Since the OCaml type float
corresponds to IEEE 754, it is safe for us to extract JavaScript num-
bers directly to OCaml float. Similarly, we provide direct OCaml
implementations for other operations on numbers mentioned in
ES5, such as conversion to and from Int32 types.
6. Evaluation: establishing trust
An important aim for us was to design JSCert and JSRef in such a
way that they could be evaluated, and hence eventually trusted, by
e.g., ECMA authors, implementors of JavaScript virtual machines,
designers of secure subsets or compilers targeting JavaScript, and
developers of JavaScript analysis tools. In this section, we describe
our methodology for establishing trust, how to extend our results in
future to strengthen such trust, and the bugs that we have found in
ES5 and ES6, test262, and several major browsers.
Our methodology for establishing trust involves four compo-
nents: the English standard ES5 and the ECMA conformance test
suite, test 262, pre-existed our work; the mechanised specification,
JSCert, and the certified interpreter, JSRef, are introduced in this
paper. We establish connections between ES5, JSCert, JSRef and
test 262, to justify our claim that JSCert and JSRef have been de-
signed in such a way that they can be evaluated and trusted. We also
explore ways of establishing further connections in future.
We have constructed JSCert to be as close as possible to ES5,
and have proved JSRef correct with respect to JSCert. Indepen-
dently, engineers have developed test 262 to cover as many aspects
of ES5 as they reasonably could. We have been able to check that
JSRef behaves as expected on all the appropriate tests, given our
coverage of ES5. JSCert and JSRef can therefore be challenged
through two distinct paths: through the eyeball correspondence
with ES5; and through the execution of tests by our reference inter-
preter. Having these two independent paths significantly decreases
the likelihood of bugs remaining in JSCert.
6.1 Connections to establish trust
Eyeball closeness. As discussed in § 4, we have designed JSCert
to be as close to ES5 as we can. We follow the ES5 data structures
precisely. Every line of pseudocode in ES5 corresponds to one or
two rules in JSCert, and our code is commented to make these
correspondences explicit. Anyone with basic training in reading
Coq specifications should be able to check the correspondence
between the ES5 prose and our JSCert definitions.
We have intentionally chosen to differ from ES5 at a few places.
We make explicit several constructs that are left implicit in ES5, to
help with the eyeball assessment that JSCert is a correct formalisa-
tion of ES5. Unlike ES5, we treat the state, exceptions, and diver-
gence explicitly. We always mention the current evaluation context
and strictness flag, whereas ES5 only describes places where they
are modified. Moreover, contrary to ES5 pseudo-code, in JSCert
we do not use a “repeat” statement but rely instead on an explicit
control-flow jump. We did experiment with an higher-order inter-
mediate form to capture “repeat” loops in the inductive semantics.
However, we concluded that it obfuscated the definitions and added
technicalities for very limited benefit. Setting aside these differ-
ences in the style of presentation, we believe that JSCert is close
enough to ES5 that (at least several) ECMA authors should be able
to proof read our definitions
Correctness. We have formally proved in Coq that JSRef is cor-
rect with respect to JSCert. More precisely, if the JSRef interpreter
evaluates program p to output o, in a finite number of steps bounded
by n, then it must be the case that the program p is related to the
output o by the inductive semantics of JSCert. More formally, the
Coq statement of the theorem is
Theorem run_javascript_correct : ∀(n:nat) (p:prog) (o:out),
run_javascript (runs n) p = result_some (specret_out o)→
red_javascript p o.
where red_javascript corresponds to the evaluation judgement ⇓p
specialised to the initial state. The proof of this theorem consists
of 3500 lines of Coq and is relatively straightforward. We inspect
the code of JSRef line by line, following the case analyses and the
function call performed and showing that each of these operations
corresponds to the application of one or two pretty-big-step evalu-
ation rules from JSCert.
More precisely, recall from § 5 that JSRef is written in a
monadic style. To step through the code of JSRef, we need to
reason about the behaviour of the monadic operators. To do this,
we prove, for each monadic operator, a lemma specifying its be-
haviour. We then define a custom Coq tactic that looks at the head
monadic operator of the JSRef piece of code at hand, and automat-
ically applies the corresponding lemma. Thanks to this tactic, we
are able to automate the reasoning on the abrupt termination cases.
As a result, our proof script basically consists of case analyses and
calls to our custom tactic with the names of the evaluation rules to
be applied given as arguments.
As we were proving correctness, we were able to detect and
correct many typos, and also a small number of more serious mis-
interpretations of ES5. JSCert and JSRef were intentionally devel-
oped by different researchers. Despite close interaction between re-
searchers, there were inevitable discrepancies in interpretation be-
tween JSCert and JSRef, which were picked up during the course
of proving correctness. This proof is a cornerstone of our work, as it
enables us directly to validate our JSCert specification with testing.
Tests. We ran JSRef against test262, the ES5 conformance test
suite. JSRef successfully executed all the tests that we expected it
to pass, given our coverage of ES5. In test262, there are 11746 tests,
organised by chapters. There are no tests for chapters 1–5. Chapters
6 and 7 relate to the parser rather than the language, chapter 15
corresponds to native libraries, and there are some additional test
directories (e.g. “best practice” and “intl402”) which we do not
study. There are 2782 main tests associated with chapters 8–14.
Our of these, we pass 1796. We have been able to check (with
the help of search tools) that all the remaining tests fail because:
either they use for-in; or they use chapter 15 library functionalities
which we have not implemented; or they fail due to the Google
Closure parser being slightly more permissive than ES5 and hence
not failing where expected.
Running JSRef over thousands of tests has been very useful,
as it allowed us to detect and fix several bugs in JSRef and JSCert.
Most of these bugs were simple typos, but a few of them were more
serious: e.g., converting a record to a data property instead of a data
accessor.
6.2 Increasing trust in JSCert and JSRef
Since we are discussing trust, we ought to also recall that, by
design, the correctness of our development relies on the formal
tools, formal libraries, parsers, compilers and glue code involved in
our tool chain. More precisely, trust in JSCert and JSRef requires
trust in Coq, Coq’s extraction mechanism, the OCaml compiler, the
Google Closure parser, our glue code for linking the parser to the
extracted code of JSRef, and our glue code for binding boolean and
floating-point JavaScript values to their OCaml counterparts.
There are three main ways in which we may further increase our
trust in JSCert and JSRef: by establishing determinacy for most of
the evaluation rules for JSCert; by establishing the completeness
of JSRef with respect to JSCert; and by using a code-coverage
analysis of JSRef to help us complete existing test suites so as to
cover all aspects of ES5. The last two correspond to the dotted
arrows in the following diagram:
ES5 JSCert JSRef Tests
eyeball correctness running tests
completeness test generation
ES5 does not explicitly say that the semantics of JavaScript
is deterministic. Yet, it turns out that, with the exception of
the loosely-specified “for-in” statement and “implementation-
dependent” constructs, the standard only describes deterministic
behaviour. We should be able to prove this. Conducting such a
proof would ensure that JSCert does not contain errors leading to
more behaviours being accepted by JSCert than ES5. If JSCert was
erroneous in this way, it could compromise e.g. the verification of
tools that compile other programming languages into JavaScript. In
future, we would like to prove in Coq that JSCert is deterministic.
We have not attempted to do this proof yet due to a limitation of the
case-analysis tactic of Coq. This tactic leads to an (unnecessary)
quadratic explosion of the size of the proof-term when performing
a nested case analysis on two derivations, precisely what is neces-
sary for proving determinacy. We are waiting for the release of the
new case-analysis tactic, under development, which should enable
us to build proof terms of size linear in that of the proof.
We would also like to prove the completeness of JSRef with re-
spect to JSCert. Currently, when executing a JavaScript program
that terminates within a reasonable amount of time, our interpreter
might, in theory, return result_impossible or result_bottom in-
stead of the expected result. (Note that, as established by the cor-
rectness result, if JSRef produces some result then it must be the
right result.) In practice, on all the tests that we considered, we
never obtained result_impossible or result_bottom. This sit-
uation is very unlikely to happen because, from looking at the
source code of JSRef, it appears obvious that we never return
result_bottom except when the bound on the number of steps is
reached, and it is relatively straightforward to check we would only
return result_impossible if the invariants on the state (e.g., there
are no dandling pointers) were to be broken. That said, it would
be more satisfying to prove in Coq that if a program is related to
some output using JSCert, then executing this program using JSRef
would produce the same output. The reason we have not done it yet
is because the invariants on the states involved are numerous and
quite arduous to define, and because completeness is not critical to
safety.
Another way to increase the trust in JSCert and JSRef would be
to extend existing test suites so as to include sufficiently many tests
to cover all the paths of ES5. With such full coverage, we would
significantly increase the degree of confidence in the correctness
of JSRef through the testing path. The ECMAScript community
acknowledges that the test262 coverage needs improvement, and
in fact has a long-standing open bug on the test262 bugzilla enti-
tled “Need academic-like review of existing test coverage versus
ES5.1” [23]. Using JSRef in combination with a coverage analy-
sis tool for OCaml programs, called the Bisect tool [14], we have
been able to visualise the lines of JSRef that are never executed by
any test program. We therefore have at least some technology for
investigating the coverage of JSRef, and hence of ES5 (provided
that JSRef does not miss entire pieces of ES5). We need more man-
power to extend test262 with the missing tests.
An alternative approach to producing tests manually would be to
generate them automatically, by using automated theorem provers
to exhibit tests whose execution is able to reach a particular line
of JSRef code. As these tests would be generated from JSRef,
they would certainly not trigger bugs in JSRef. However, if these
tests were to fail on other JavaScript virtual machines, then we
would know that there is either a bug in JSRef or in the virtual
machines. This alternative approach to producing tests would in-
crease our trust in JSRef, by showing that it mainly behaves like
existing JavaScript implementations on tests that cover all of its
source code and by highlighting where it diverges from particular
implementations.
6.3 Bugs discovered
Through our work, we have been trying to understand and ex-
press in Coq the semantics of JavaScript, including its darkest cor-
ners. To understand the semantics intended by ECMA authors and
the semantics intended by implementers of JavaScript virtual ma-
chines, we looked not only at ES5, but also at the next version of
ECMAScript (ES6), at several test suites, and at the behaviour of
the major browsers. We spotted bugs in all of these places, obtain-
ing confirmation from ECMA authors and JavaScript implementers
that they were indeed bugs.
In ES6, we discovered three bugs, ranging from simple typos to
an “informative algorithm” which did not correctly implement the
behaviour it was claiming. In test262, we discovered three bugs,
the most interesting being a test which contains code that seems
to do nothing and whose purpose is unknown to the current main-
tainers. V8 and Webkit incorrectly implement enumeration in the
presence of shadowing, as used by for−in. This was discovered by
Miller [60] and strengthened by ourselves. All browser implemen-
tations give (different) incorrect completion values for try...catch
...finally, also discovered in part by Bargull [60]. In addition, we
observed in V8 that dead code after a try...catch...finally block
may incorrectly change the value that is returned by the block [60].
Finding bugs in browsers, standards and industry tests was not
the main motivation for the work presented here. The bugs men-
tioned are simply a side effect of attempting to understand ES5
well enough to build JSCert and JSRef. In future, we hope to use
JSRef to construct more complete test suites, for potentially detect-
ing unknown bugs in existing browsers.
7. Conclusions and future work
This paper investigates a scientific method for developing a trusted,
mechanised specification of a programming language. We focused
on JavaScript because the language is and will continue to be
used by many people, the standards are quite mature and still
evolving, and, for many applications, JavaScript programs need
to be secure. There are a few key tools used to support large-
scale language formalisations; see related work. We used the Coq
theorem prover, because it supports large-scale mechanised proof
as well as specification, and it has a well-used mechanism for
extracting executable OCaml code.
We have introduced JSCert, a Coq specification of ES5, and JS-
Ref, an executable reference interpreter which is provably correct
with respect to JSCert. JSCert closely corresponds to ES5, follow-
ing its natural modularity. JSRef is tested against industrial test
suites. Our design methodology means that (assuming you trust
Coq), if you trust either the eyeball connection to ES5 or the in-
dustrial tests, you can trust both JSCert and JSRef.
It remains to be seen what impact might be possible with the
ECMA standards. For ES6, which is nearing the end of its devel-
opment, we have filed bug reports and are having on-going discus-
sions with some of its authors. For ES7, our work demonstrates
that it might be feasible for a Coq specification to evolve at nearly
the same time as the English standard. One key question is what
might we be able to offer the ECMA standards. It is not our role
to make key design decisions for ECMAScript. We do, however,
believe that providing an official mechanised specification along-
side the English prose standard would add significant value for tool
developers and language analysts. Moreover, an executable refer-
ence interpreter that provably complies with the Coq specification
and passes the ECMA tests can help validate language implementa-
tions or optimisations, by providing an oracle to define the expected
results of new tests.
We have many future plans. To begin with, we would like
to increase as much as possible the trust in our definitions, as
explained in § 6, by formalising determinacy and completeness
in Coq, by running additional test suites (e.g., Firefox tests), and
by designing new tests towards achieving full coverage of ES5.
Then, we would also like to extend our formalisation. First, it could
be interesting to investigate the formalisation of parsing. Second,
we may want to formalise browser-specific behaviours. Third, we
would be interested in extending our work to ES6 and ES7. We are,
of course, also interested in many of the practical applications of
our work, as discussed in § 1.
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